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Abstract 
Previous studies have demonstrated that a multitude of options can lead to choice overload, 
reducing decision quality. Through controlled experiments, we examine sequential choice 
architectures that enable the choice set to remain large while potentially reducing the effect of 
choice overload. A specific tournament-style architecture achieves this goal. An alternate 
architecture in which subjects compare each subset of options to the most preferred option 
encountered thus far fails to improve performance due to the status quo bias. Subject preferences 
over different choice architectures are negatively correlated with performance, suggesting that 
providing choice over architectures might reduce the quality of decisions. 
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I. Introduction 
Many decisions involve large choice sets from which one option must be selected. Financial 
retirement planning and health care insurance selection both present individuals with a seemingly 
limitless number of options. For example, Medicare participants are confronted with numerous 
health insurance and prescription drug plans. Even less-consequential decisions often involve 
large choice sets, including shopping for a car, a cell phone plan, or a box of cereal. Traditional 
economic theory holds that more choice is better as the optimum over a proper subset can never 
be larger than the optimum over the original set. While a rational decision maker benefits from a 
wealth of choice, studies have found that larger choice sets can reduce one’s satisfaction with the 
decision (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), the likelihood of making a decision (Redelmeier and Shafir 
1995, Iyengar and Lepper 2000, Roswarski and Murray 2006), and the quality and optimality of 
the decision (Payne et al. 1993, Tanius et al. 2009, Schram and Sonnemans 2011, Hanoch et al. 
2011, Besedeš et al. 2012, and Heiss et al. 2012).  
One way of dealing with a large choice set is simply to reduce its size. However, such an 
approach clearly has many undesirable attributes, chief among which are ethical concerns over 
paternalism and the reduction in some individuals’ ability to obtain their most preferred option. 
Alternatively, one can ask what tools can assist decision makers while maintaining a plethora of 
options. Some have suggested a form of “libertarian paternalism” that nudges toward a decision 
while preserving all options (Sunstein and Thaler 2003), such as presenting additional options 
only if an individual requests them (Iyengar and Jiang 2000). The effectiveness of this approach 
relies on an assumption that people who request the additional options are benefitted by them, 
and those who do not are benefitted by the smaller choice set. We examine experimentally the 
ability of different choice architectures to improve decision making. Additionally, as people are 
likely heterogeneous in their decision-making approaches, we examine individuals’ ability to 
identify their most suitable choice architecture. 
Choice architectures we consider reduce a large decision problem into a series of smaller 
ones. Such procedures approach a problem sequentially, eliminating a few options at a time. 
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Sequential elimination techniques have been recommended for managerial decision making 
(Stroh et al. 2008) and patient counseling (Oostendorp et al. 2011), and are enshrined in the rules 
of parliamentary procedure (Robert et al. 2011). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, their 
ability to stimulate optimal decision-making has not been considered.  
The choice set we consider consists of lotteries structured in such a way that choices can 
be objectively ranked independent of personal idiosyncratic preferences. This is an advantage of 
the laboratory over the “real world” where  decisions cannot be ranked without knowing each 
person’s risk preferences and subjective beliefs. The benchmark simultaneous choice procedure 
involves picking one option among sixteen options considered at once, a large enough number of 
options where the effects of choice overload have been found (Tanius et al. 2009, Hanoch et al. 
2011, Besedeš et al. 2012). Additionally, we consider two sequential procedures, with subjects 
considering subsets of the sixteen options over several rounds. In the sequential elimination 
architecture, the decision maker first selects among four randomly-provided options. Then, the 
three options that were not selected are eliminated and replaced with three new options alongside 
the previously-selected one. This procedure repeats for a total of five rounds, until all sixteen 
options have been considered. In the sequential tournament architecture, the sixteen options are 
randomly divided into four sets of four options each. In the first four rounds, the decision maker 
selects one option from each of the four smaller sets. In the final round, the subject selects from 
among the four previously-selected options. Both sequential architectures involve subjects 
working through five rounds with four options in each but differ in whether the previously-
selected option is carried into the next round (sequential elimination) or into a final round 
(sequential tournament).  
After subjects make decisions under all three choice architectures, we elicit their 
preferences over the three choice architectures. The computer then randomly eliminates one of 
the three architectures and subjects complete another task in the more preferred of the two 
remaining architectures. This allows us to examine whether subject preferences coincide with the 
architecture that leads each to the best decision. 
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A rational decision maker who evaluates the expected profit from each option and selects 
the optimal one from each choice set should not be affected by the simultaneous or sequential 
nature of the decision-problem. A number of heuristic approaches, including several sequential 
rationales (Manzini and Mariotti 2007) and satisficing strategies (Simon 1956) may yield better 
outcomes from simultaneous choice. Conversely, a subject susceptible to choice overload may 
benefit from the smaller choice sets inherent in sequential choice. Regardless of the benefits of 
smaller choice sets, the introduction of sequential choice also changes decision making (Read 
and Loewenstein 1995).  
Sequential decisions are subject to a status quo bias, an inertia by which the most recent 
selection is likely to be maintained in the next decision (Agnew et al. 2003, Kool et al. 2010). 
Explanations for the status quo bias include psychological attachment to the previous choice, 
satisficing behavior, decision avoidance, and reduction of cognitive costs. While the sequential 
elimination architecture is perhaps more intuitive, its carryover of the selected option into the 
next decision round may exacerbate the status quo bias, reducing the likelihood of optimal 
choice. The sequential tournament architecture in which all previously-selected options appear 
together in the final round may mitigate this effect. 
We identify three main results. First, we find that the sequential tournament generates the 
best overall performance. Second, sequential elimination offers no improvement over 
simultaneous choice due to the presence of significant inertia in subjects’ sequential decisions. 
Third, while the sequential tournament generates the best performance, this choice architecture is 
least preferred by subjects of the three considered. We find evidence of adverse self-sorting, by 
which a portion of subjects select choice architectures that lead them to suboptimal choices. This 
suggests that allowing individuals to select their preferred choice architecture need not lead to 
improvements in decision making. 
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1s, five Card 2s, 4 Card 3s, and so on. A person who selected Option A would earn $25 for this 
task if a Card 1, Card 3, Card 5, Card 7, Card 8, or Card 11 were randomly drawn and would 
receive zero otherwise. Thus, the likelihood of a Card 1 being drawn is 3 out of 100 and the 
likelihood that Option A results in payment is 3 + 4 + 9 + 4 + 1 2 + 15 = 47 out of 100.     
 Second, in the sequential elimination architecture, subjects selected one option from 
sixteen possible options through a series of five rounds. In the first round, Options A through D 
were presented and one was selected. The selected option, along with Options E through G, was 
presented in round two. When the selected option was joined by three new options, it remained 
in its original position. The option selected in round 2 was then presented along with Options H 
through J in round three, and so on through rounds four and five until all sixteen options had 
been presented. The final (fifth round) decision was the subject’s selected option for the task.  
Third, in the sequential tournament architecture, subjects also selected one option from 
sixteen possible options through a series of five rounds. In the first round, Options A through D 
were presented and one was selected. In the second round, Options E through H were presented 
and one was selected, and so on. By the end of the fourth round, the subject had seen all 16 
options and selected one from each round. These four previously selected options were then 
presented in the fifth round in the same order in which they were selected and the final choice 
was made. The difference between sequential elimination and sequential tournament is that in 
sequential elimination the option selected in one round appears again in the next round, whereas 
in sequential tournament, a selected option does not reappear until the final round.1 
By design, our decision tasks are fairly straightforward, with each option representing a 
binary lottery with some probability. While real-world decisions are more complex, they also do 
not allow for an objective measure of decision quality as subjects differ in risk preferences or 
relative importance of different attributes. Our design allows us to evaluate and rank choices 
objectively. Despite each option’s simplicity, past studies have shown that a majority of people 
fail to select optimally (Besedeš et al. 2012).  
                                                            
1 In experimental instructions we referred to simultaneous choice as select one, to sequential elimination as keep 
one, and to sequential tournament as send to final. These terms describe what subjects do in each task.  
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 Subjects were first required to complete a task using each of the three choice 
architectures, the order of which was randomized for each subject. Architecture-specific 
instructions were provided just before completing each task and subjects learned their earnings 
from each task at the end of that task.2 Prior to the fourth task, subjects provided a ranking of the 
three architectures which was used to select the choice architecture for the fourth task. This was 
incentivized by having the computer randomly eliminate one of the three choice architectures 
and implement the higher ranked of the two remaining choice architectures for the fourth task. 
This procedure provides incentive for subjects to rank not only their most preferred architecture 
first, but also to take seriously the second and third ranking. Subjects received instruction that it 
is in their best interest to reveal their preferences truthfully as the procedure yielded a 2/3 chance 
of using the choice architecture reported as being most preferred and no chance of using the one 
reported as being least preferred. While subjects experienced the three choice architectures in a 
random order over the first three tasks, this ranking procedure was always last so that subjects 
could make an informed decision.   
To provide four similar, but not identical, choice tasks, the probability distributions were 
altered slightly across decision tasks. The four choice tasks are described in Table 1. The four 
probability distributions, PDF1 through PDF4, have similar probabilities for the most and least 
likely outcomes and nearly identical average probabilities across options (between 56.3 and 
56.4). The black areas in Table 1 represent the states covered by each option. No two options are 
identical either in terms of the states contained, or in terms of expected value under any of the 
PDFs. The optimal option resulted in receiving the prize with approximately an 80% chance 
while the worst option yielded the prize with approximately 34% chance. To further ensure that 
the choice tasks appeared significantly different to subjects, the order of PDFs across tasks, and 
of options and states within tasks, was randomized. Thus, the subjects faced four similar decision 
problems, but could not use information about one problem on a subsequent one. Notably, while 
                                                            
2 Copies of the instructions are available in the Appendix. 
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subjects had the ability to provide post-experiment feedback, none noted any similarity in the 
underlying set of options across tasks. 
Table 1: Choice Tasks 
Card     PDF     Options 
      1  2  3  4     A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P 
1  15  13  13  12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2  14  14  14  12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
3  12  11  12  9  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
4  11  8  8  14  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
5  10  12  10  11  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
6  9  7  5  10  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
7  7  6  9  5  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
8  6  7  7  8  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
9  5  9  6  7  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
10  4  5  9  6  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
11  4  4  4  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
12     3  4  3  3        1  1     1  1  1  1        1  1  1  1  1  1 
States Covered:  8  8  8  6  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  8  6  6  6  6 
    Expected Payoffs:                             
PDF  1  80  75 72 68 63 61 59 57 55 53 50  48  47  45 36 32
PDF  2  80  73 66 65 63 61 59 57 58 56 51  54  44  42 39 35
PDF  3  79  71 68 64 63 60 61 58 57 54 49  53  46  43 38 36
            PDF  4     78  72 69 66 62 67 55 60 52 57 46  53  43  48 41 34
 
Prior to the four tasks of interest, subjects reviewed instructions and completed a four-
option four-state task to familiarize them with the computer interface. After selecting among the 
options in a task, subjects were shown a deck of cards reflecting the appropriate PDF.  A subject 
then had the computer turn the cards face down and shuffle the deck, following which she chose 
one card (see Appendix for graphical interface). If the chosen card reflected a state covered by 
the selected option, the subject earned $25 for the task. For example, if the subject selected 
option G in Figure 1 and then chose Card 2, she would earn $25 for that task. However, if she 
chose Card 6 instead, the earnings for that task would be $0.   
After the experiment was completed, one of the four tasks was randomly selected for 
payment. Each subject was paid his or her earnings for that task. In addition, the subjects were 
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paid a $5 participation fee.  The average salient earnings were $17.66 exclusive of the $5 
participation payment, while the average amount of time spent in the experiment was 26 minutes, 
of which five and a half minutes were spent on instructions and the rest on actively completing 
all tasks.  
The experiment was conducted through Vanderbilt University’s eLab, an online lab with 
a pool of more than 70,000 subjects who have expressed a willingness to participate in 
experiments. Consistent with eLab policies, the subjects were mailed a check for their earnings 
in this study immediately after participating. eLab recruits subjects into its pool using links from 
partner sites, online advertisements, referrals from other panelists, and links from online search 
results, among other sources. eLab collects information on age, sex, and educational attainment 
from members of its subject pool, allowing us to capture this demographic information without 
collecting the information directly during the study. Our subject pool was 51% male with an 
average age of 48 years (standard deviation of 16). In terms of educational attainment, 30% of 
the subjects were college graduates, 32% had some college, and 38% had no schooling beyond 
high school.  
III. Results 
A. Choice Architecture and Quality of Decisions 
We begin with a summary of overall performance on the first three tasks using two different 
measures. The first measure, “Optimal Choice,” is the frequency with which subjects select the 
option that yields the highest likelihood of payment. The second measure reflects how far the 
selected option is from the optimal one. It is equal to the difference between the probability of 
receiving payment under the optimal option and the probability of receiving payment under the 
selected option. We refer to this measure as “Money Left on the Table” since it reflects the 
reduction in the probability of payment from suboptimal choice. Across all tasks, subjects select 
optimally 28% of the time and selected options have an average probability of payment that is 14 
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percentage points lower than the optimal option. Thus, with $25 at stake, subjects on average 
earn $3.50 (= $25 × 0.14) less than they would with optimal choices.3  
Results across choice architectures are presented in Table 2. The sequential tournament 
leads to a significantly higher frequency of optimal choice than either simultaneous choice or 
sequential elimination (Wilcoxon p=0.011 and 0.029, respectively), while sequential elimination 
and simultaneous choice are not significantly different (p=0.470). Sequential tournament also 
leads to less money left on the table than simultaneous choice (p=0.047), while sequential 
elimination is not significantly different from simultaneous choice (p=0.864). While Table 2 
suggests that the three architectures lead to similar amounts of money left on the table in the 
aggregate, there is significant heterogeneity across subjects. In particular, the average difference 
between a subject’s best and worst architecture (in the amount of money left on the table) is 0.15. 
On average, each subject’s best architecture represents a 26% increase in payoff over his or her 
worst architecture. 
Table 2 ‐ Average Performance across Choice Architectures 
   Optimal Choice   Money Left on the Table 
Simultaneous choice  23%  0.14 
Sequential elimination  25%  0.14 
Sequential tournament  36%  0.12 
 
To control for confounding effects of task and demographic characteristics, we estimate a 
probit regression for optimal choice and an OLS regression for money left on the table. We have 
a total of 333 observations, 3 for each subject. We include demographic variables for age, sex, 
and dummies for educational attainment (some college and college graduate, with high school 
the omitted variable). We also include PDF and task order fixed effects (suppressed for brevity). 
Treatment dummy variables for the sequential choice architectures are included (with 
simultaneous choice as the omitted variable). 
Table 3 ‐ Factors Influencing Choice Quality 
                                                            
3 The main results are qualitatively unchanged if we use alternative measures of efficiency, such as the ratio of 
payoffs of the chosen and optimal options.  
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Optimal Choice  Money Left on the Table 
Sequential elimination  0.108  ‐0.443 
(0.128)  (1.368) 
Sequential tournament  0.448***  ‐2.164* 
(0.163)  (1.151) 
Age  ‐0.006  0.061 
(0.006)  (0.049) 
Male dummy  ‐0.087  2.167 
(0.202)  (1.690) 
Some college  0.678***  ‐5.608*** 
(0.240)  (2.059) 
College graduate  0.584**  ‐5.892*** 
(0.253)  (1.890) 
Constant  ‐0.670*  12.141*** 
(0.392)  (3.275) 
Observations  333  333 
log likelihood  ‐184  ‐1280 
Probit coefficients reported for optimal choice, OLS for Money Left on the Table. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. PDF and task order 
fixed effects included, but not reported. Money left on the table was measured on a 0‐100 scale. 
 
 Estimated coefficients in Table 3 confirm the relative performance results in Table 2. 
Sequential elimination does not lead to a significant improvement over simultaneous choice, 
while the sequential tournament architecture significantly improves the quality of choices, both 
in terms of increased frequency of optimal choice and reduced amount of money left on the 
table. Of the demographic variables, age and sex appear to play no role while education beyond 
high school is correlated with an estimated twenty percentage point increase in the chance of 
selecting the optimal option. Averaging across subjects, the sequential tournament architecture 
leads to a predicted fourteen percentage point increase in optimal choice frequency relative to 
simultaneous choice. Conversely, sequential elimination leads to no significant improvement.       
B. Choice Overload and the Status Quo Bias 
The choice overload hypothesis suggests that smaller choice sets can result in better decisions. In 
our experiment, each round in the sequential elimination and sequential tournament architectures 
involves a choice among only four options whereas the simultaneous decision architecture 
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involves a choice among sixteen options. We first examine whether decision making is better in 
4-option choices than in 16-option choices (Table 4). Measures of optimal choice and money left 
on the table are relative to the set of options available in each round. Thus, for the simultaneous 
decision, these measures coincide with those in Table 3, but do not for the other two 
architectures. We again consider only the first three tasks, and exclude the fourth task in which 
subjects chose the choice architecture. The frequency of optimal choice when selecting among 
16 options at once is only 23%, while the average across all rounds in sequential architectures is 
47%. This is consistent with choice overload.  
Table 4 ‐ Round‐by‐Round Performance 
Task  Optimal Choice  Money Left on the Table 
Simultaneous choice (16 options)  23%  0.14 
Sequential elimination (4 options)  46%  0.08 
Sequential tournament (4 options)  48%  0.08 
 
 Our results so far indicate decision making is better when fewer options are considered at 
once, but that the way a large set of options is broken into smaller parts matters for the quality of 
the final decision. Given this result, we try to understand why performance in the sequential 
tournament architecture is superior to performance in the sequential elimination architecture 
even though both entail the same number of decisions over choice sets of the same size. We offer 
two possible explanations. 
First, we consider the possibility that subjects simply make independent errors in each 
round. These independent errors, even if equal across architectures, produce different rates of 
optimal choice among all sixteen options for the two sequential architectures. For a subject to 
select the optimal option in the sequential tournament architecture, she must select optimally in 
two rounds: the round in which the option first appears, and the final round. For the sequential 
elimination architecture, the subject must select optimally in the first round in which the optimal 
option appears, and in each subsequent round. Statistically, this makes the chance of selecting 
the optimal option higher in the sequential tournament architecture than in the sequential 
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elimination architecture.4 In our case, the 46% chance of selecting the best option in each round 
of sequential elimination would translate into a 16% overall chance of selecting the optimal 
option under the assumption of independent errors. For the sequential tournament architecture, 
the 48% in each round translates into a 23% of selecting the optimal option in the final round. 
The actual rates from Table 2 are substantially higher for both architectures, suggesting that 
simple independent error rates cannot fully explain our results.  
Second, we consider the possibility that errors are not independent across rounds due to 
the status quo bias. The selection of an option in one round may cause a subject to overvalue that 
same option in the next round, or to view selecting another option as a psychologically costly 
disaffirmation of their previous choice (Kahneman et al. 1991), or simply to prefer not to have to 
make another decision. Whatever its cause, sequential elimination may lay a trap for subjects 
susceptible to the status quo bias by carrying a selected option over to the next round. An error in 
selection in one round is likely to persist as the subject continues to select the same option in 
subsequent rounds. Conversely, in the sequential tournament architecture, all options presented 
concurrently are on equal footing: either none has been previously considered or, in the final 
round, all have been selected in a previous round.  
We use McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model to estimate subject choices in each 
round as a function of two predictive variables: (i) the expected payoff, or expected probability 
of payment of each option, which proxies for optimal choice, and (ii) in the sequential 
elimination architecture, whether the option was selected in the previous round. Specifically, 
“Expected Payoff” is coded as the probability of payment, between zero and one. The “Selected 
Previous Round” dummy equals one for options in rounds two through five of the sequential 
elimination architecture that were selected in the previous round, and equals zero for all other 
                                                            
4 Denote by p the probability of selecting the best option in each round. For the sequential tournament architecture, 
this translates into a probability of ultimately selecting the optimal option of p2. For the sequential elimination 
architecture, the probability that the optimal option appears in the first round is 4/16, and it is 3/16 for subsequent 
rounds. Thus, the probability of selecting the optimal option is ଷଵ଺ ݌ሺ1 ൅ ݌ ൅ ݌ଶ ൅ ݌ଷ ൅
ସ
ଷ ݌ସሻ. The sequential 
tournament architecture leads to a higher probability of selecting the optimal option whenever p>1/4.  
13 
 
options. We consider three subsets of data: decisions in each of the sequential architectures 
separately and pooled. Table 5 presents the estimates. 
Table 5 – Status Quo Bias  
Sequential Elimination  Sequential Tournament Pooled Sequential 
Expected Payoff          4.627***          5.324***         4.925*** 
(0.631)  (0.601)  (0.513) 
Selected Previous Round          0.459***          0.550*** 
(0.134)  (0.125) 
Observations (Options)  2,220  2,220  4,440 
Observations (Decisions)  111  111  222 
log likelihood  ‐687    ‐691    ‐1373 
Conditional logit coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses, with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.  
 
The significance of expected payoff indicates that better options are selected with higher 
probability. The significance of selected previous round suggests that subjects exhibit the status 
quo bias in the sequential elimination tasks. Given the within-subject nature of our design, the 
consistency of the payoff heuristic across architectures is not surprising.5 Yet, when the status 
quo bias is provided an opportunity to manifest, subjects change their decision-making approach 
to place additional reliance on the option previously selected. The relative parameter magnitudes 
indicate that the status quo bias is equivalent to approximately 10 (= 4.627/0.459) percentage 
points of the probability of payment. For example, a previously-selected option with a 70% 
chance of payment has a similar probability of being selected as a new option with an 80% 
chance of payment. Thus, the status quo bias causes subjects to stick with options they selected, 
even if they are not optimal.  
C. Revealed Preferences for Choice Architecture 
Thus far, our results have focused on how the choice architecture impacts decision quality. We 
now examine which choice architecture subjects prefer according to their rankings of 
                                                            
5 We pool across both sequential architectures to show the consistency of the payoff variable. By the nature of the 
conditional logit estimator, separate regressions do not allow direct comparisons of parameters due to their 
confluence with potentially different variances. Confidence that these are similar is gained in column three which 
imposes identical variance on both.  
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architectures, and how those revealed preferences correlate with the quality of their decisions. 
More than a half of our subjects, 59 out of 111, preferred the simultaneous choice architecture, 
while 29 (26%) preferred sequential elimination, and the remaining 23 (21%) preferred the 
sequential tournament. These preferences run opposite to the proportion of subjects selecting 
optimally under each architecture. The joint preference ranking of the least preferred choice 
architecture is almost a mirror image of the most preferred ranking. Just over a half of our 
subjects, 56, revealed sequential tournament as the least preferred architecture, followed by 30 
(27%) who rated sequential elimination as the least preferred, and 25 (23%) who rated 
simultaneous choice as the least preferred architecture. 
Given our procedure for eliciting rankings, subjects had a 2/3 chance of using their most 
preferred architecture for the fourth task and a 1/3 chance of using their second-most preferred 
architecture. Table 6 reports overall performance on the fourth task by choice architecture, and 
includes performance from the first three tasks in parentheses for comparison. Again, 
performance is best under the sequential tournament architecture despite the fact that it is the 
least preferred. Table 6 also reveals a suggestive pattern. While performance in both sequential 
architectures is better the second time it is used (in task 4), performance in the simultaneous 
decision is actually worse the second time it is used than when it was first encountered. This 
suggests an adverse self-sorting in subjects’ preferences for the simultaneous choice architecture.  
Table 6 ‐ Performance on Task 4 (Average Performance on Tasks 1‐3) 
Task  Optimal Choice  Money Left on the Table 
Simultaneous choice (N=53)  15%  (23%)  0.15  (0.14) 
Sequential elimination (N=33)  27%  (25%)  0.11  (0.14) 
Sequential tournament (N=25)  40%  (36%)   0.08  (0.12) 
 
  To explore the possibility of adverse self-sorting, we investigate the frequency with 
which subjects prefer the choice architecture under which they performed best initially. We focus 
on subjects whose performance under one architecture was strictly better than under the other 
two. For this purpose, we say a subject performed unambiguously best in a particular choice 
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architecture if the rank of the selected option is higher in that architecture than in the other two.6 
If a subject did equally well under two procedures then no unambiguously best architecture is 
identified. The data are tabulated in Table 7. 
Table 7 – Unambiguously Best Architecture Performance  and Architecture Preferences 
Most preferred architecture 
Unambiguously Best Architecture 
Simultaneous 
choice 
Sequential 
elimination 
Sequential 
tournament 
Simultaneous choice (N=21)  62%  14%  24% 
Sequential elimination (N=22)  36%  50%  14% 
Sequential tournament (N=30)  73%  10%  17% 
None (N=38)  42%  32%  26% 
 
 If subjects’ preferences over choice architecture were associated with how well they 
performed in each, entries should fall along the diagonal in Table 7. Twenty-one subjects did 
best in simultaneous choice, of which 62% identified it as their most preferred architecture. Of 
the 22 subjects who did best in sequential elimination, 50% identified it as their most preferred 
procedure. The most surprising results are for those who do best in the sequential tournament. Of 
the 30 subjects who did best in sequential tournament, only 17% identified it as their most 
preferred architecture while 73% preferred simultaneous choice. This means that individuals who 
perform best in sequential tournament are more likely to prefer simultaneous choice than those 
who actually performed best in simultaneous choice. The 38 subjects for whom no 
unambiguously best architecture is identified exhibit a similar adverse self-sorting. While a 
plurality of these subjects prefer simultaneous choice, 85% do at least as well under the 
sequential tournament architecture. 
 To understand the source of subjects’ preferences over architectures, we estimate a 
multinomial logit regression. The dependent variable is the preferred architecture. Our 
explanatory variables are: expected payoff from the option chosen under each architecture, actual 
                                                            
6 We obtain the same qualitative results if we consider only subjects who chose optimally under exactly one 
mechanism or by defining “unambiguously best” based on which architecture yielded the highest expected payoff or 
lowest amount of money left on the table. The challenge with the latter two definitions is that ordinally-equivalent 
choices lead to different payoffs due to slight variations across PDFs by design.  
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earnings under each architecture, total decision time of each sequential architecture relative to 
the simultaneous choice architecture, and demographic variables for age, sex, and education. The 
expected payoff from each option examines whether preferences are correlated with 
performance, while earnings examine whether subjects respond to actual (randomly determined) 
payoffs instead of those that are a priori optimal. The relative time measures examine if subjects 
aim to minimize decision time. On average, subjects spent 120% more time on sequential 
elimination and 90% more time on sequential tournament than on simultaneous choice. Results 
are presented in Table 8. Coefficients are presented as relative risk ratios for preferring each 
sequential architecture relative to simultaneous choice. Thus, coefficients less than one imply 
that the parameter makes preferring the sequential architecture less likely than simultaneous 
choice. 
 We find that the preference for sequential elimination is increasing with performance and 
decreasing with time. Specifically, a subject who takes twice as long on sequential elimination as 
simultaneous choice is 37% less likely to prefer sequential elimination as a subject who spends 
equal time on both. However, this extra time is exactly offset if sequential elimination leads to 
the selection of an option that is six percentage points better (in expected payoff) than the one 
selected under simultaneous choice. Thus, while there is a preference for architectures which 
allow for faster decision making, subjects may be willing to invest the additional time if they are 
able to increase the expected payoff of their selection by at least six percentage points. This 
equates roughly to ten percent of the average expected payoff.  
 Additionally, we find that college graduates are substantially more likely to prefer 
simultaneous choice to sequential elimination beyond any performance-based or time-based 
reasons. We find no evidence that architecture preference is related to the probabilistic outcome 
of whether or not one actually earned a payment. For the sequential tournament architecture, we 
find no significant relationships between performance, time, and preference. The only significant 
variable is a curious spillover effect between performance in sequential elimination and 
preference for sequential tournament.  
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Table 8 – Determinants of Architecture Preferences 
  Elimination  Tournament 
Expected Payoff in …   
     Simultaneous choice    1.012  1.044 
  (0.029)  (0.035) 
     Sequential elimination    1.060**  1.050** 
  (0.031)  (0.024) 
     Sequential tournament    0.941**  0.960 
  (0.025)  (0.027) 
Actual Earnings in …   
     Simultaneous choice    1.018  0.502 
  (0.619)  (0.304) 
     Sequential elimination    0.765  0.706 
  (0.405)  (0.431) 
     Sequential tournament    0.585  0.421 
  (0.350)  (0.269) 
Relative decision time   
     Sequential elimination    0.632**  0.924 
          /  simultaneous elimination    (0.116)  (0.178) 
     Sequential tournament    0.976  0.896 
          /  simultaneous elimination    (0.129)  (0.127) 
Age    1.009  1.019 
  (0.016)  (0.018) 
Male dummy    1.089  1.256 
  (0.655)  (0.742) 
Some college dummy    1.970  2.312 
  (1.338)  (1.549) 
College graduates dummy    0.252*  1.294 
  (0.178)  (0.828) 
Constant    0.934  0.019 
  (2.304)  (0.049) 
Observations    111 
log likelihood    ‐95 
Multinomial logit coefficients reflecting relative probability of architecture preference (relative to simultaneous choice). 
Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses, with ** and * denoting significance at 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Overall, the analysis suggests that subjects quite deliberately consider the simultaneous 
choice and sequential elimination architectures, taking into account both decision time and 
decision performance, and on aggregate selecting the better of these two architectures. However, 
by not considering as heavily the sequential tournament architecture, subjects are effectively 
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deciding between two architectures that are both similar in aggregate performance and inferior to 
the least preferred architecture. 
There are several reasons for subjects’ selecting an architecture that does not lead to the 
best choice. First, it is entirely possible that subjects are not good at evaluating the quality of 
their decisions and thus err in selecting an architecture. Alternately, subjects may very well be 
making rational choices that weigh the costs of a suboptimal architecture against its perceived 
benefits. For example, we noted above that the simultaneous choice architecture takes less time. 
Aside from time, simultaneous choice may be heavily preferred precisely because it entails 
making only one decision while both sequential architectures require more cognitive effort as 
they entail five decisions. Further, the sequential tournament may be considered more 
psychologically discomforting because it requires five active decisions. In contrast, sequential 
elimination allows a subject to make one active decision in the first round and simply stick with 
that choice in every subsequent round. That is, the status quo bias may be a rational response to 
decision costs. As anticipated cognitive demands play an important role in decision making 
(Kool et al.  2010), subjects may be willing to accept a less optimal outcome in exchange for less 
cognitive effort. However, the key insight is that (whatever the cause), subjects are unlikely to 
select the architecture that leads to the best choice. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
By now, several studies have suggested that increased choice may not be beneficial to decision 
makers. Despite the greater likelihood of a better option being available, a wider variety of 
choices may lead to choice overload, greater regret, and more indecision. This has led some to 
suggest that choice sets should be restricted (Schwartz 2005). From a practical standpoint, all 
proposals calling for restricting a choice set face the criticism of being paternalistic in 
determining how choices are restricted.   
Instead of attempting to restrict the choice set, we seek to identify a choice architecture 
that will enhance decision quality while maintaining the size of the choice set. Consistent with 
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previous work, we find that decision making improves when fewer options are considered 
concurrently. Thus, our focus is on two sequential processes that break a decision into a series of 
choices each among a small number of options. The intuitive and commonly suggested 
sequential elimination approach is actually not beneficial. When a previously-selected option is 
compared to a new subset of options, subjects exhibit a status quo bias which causes them to 
undervalue new options.   
 Our sequential tournament process does succeed in improving the quality of decision 
making. This choice architecture first places options into subgroups and then the options selected 
from each subgroup are combined into a final set from which the ultimate decision is made. It 
captures the advantage of a small choice set for each decision while avoiding the effects of the 
status quo bias.  
 While we find that a sequential tournament improves aggregate decision making, 
individuals prefer to make decisions from all of the options at once. In the aggregate, there is a 
negative correlation between architecture performance and architecture choice. We find evidence 
of adverse self-sorting with subjects preferring choice architectures in which they did not have 
their best performance. Thus, simply letting people select a choice architecture may be 
insufficient to facilitate improved decision making.   
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue for “libertarian paternalism,” a decision-making 
intervention in which choice architectures direct individuals towards certain choices while 
maintaining the opportunity to select among the full range of options. For example, Iyengar and 
Jiang (2000) suggest that people should initially be presented with only a few options while 
retaining the ability to consider a larger set of options if they so choose. The desirability of such 
a choice architecture inherently assumes that adverse self-sorting is not a problem and that only 
the right people expand the choice set. Specifically, for such an architecture to improve choice 
quality, preferences over choice set size and performance under different choice set sizes need to 
correspond.  
Our findings essentially push the paternalistic discussion associated with choice overload 
back one level. More, but not all, people would select better options with a sequential 
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tournament; however, this choice architecture is the least preferred of those we consider.  
Therefore, in some cases, policy makers or others designing a choice problem may wish to 
impose an unpopular procedure in order to improve decision making quality. Clearly, the 
appropriateness of such libertarian paternalism needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.      
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